During the December 2008  events,  there were several confrontations between the demonstrators and the police Units for Restoring Order (MAT), fully equipped with gas masks. These confrontations were accompanied by the  use of teargas,  flash/noise grenades and plastic bullets by the MAT against the demonstrators;  the hurling of rocks, eggs, fruit, Molotov cocktails and expletives (e.g. “cops, pigs, murderers”) by the demonstrators  against the police; the erection of roadblocks; and the occupations or infiltration of universities, schools, radio/TV stations and theatres by demonstrators.² Some of the demonstrators, especially those on the  front, wore masks and hoods. While there were no deaths resulting directly from the violent confrontations, there was extensive property damage, both public and private, including banks, ATM machines, automobiles, stores of all kinds and sizes, multinational companies,  police vans, political party offices, bus stops, telephone booths, citizen’s information centers,  theatres and cinemas, garbage bins, sidewalks, kiosks, the Mayor of Athen’s Christmas Tree,  and even university libraries. The property destruction was also accompanied by a new generation of graffiti on the walls of buildings, indicating the demonstrators’ motivations, their program of action as well as attempts to connect with the anti-globalization movements.  As of 11 December 2008, over 565 businesses were affected by the rampages, 465 of which were in the Athens area.  For almost 3 weeks, the historical center of Athens was a battleground; it was essentially deserted, the business cycle was interrupted;  tourism in the “historical center” center of Athens came to a stop; on top of that, the US and Australian embassies circulated travel advisories for their citizens to avoid the urban areas likely to have confrontations. All this happened during the annual discount period, when the business community was hoping to recover some losses due to economic crisis. We have as yet no idea of total costs for rehabilitation of property, unemployment losses etc for Athens or the other cities of Greece though some estimates for Athens alone put the costs at 1 billion euros and the number of threatened jobs throughout Greece (along with salaries and Christmas bonuses), as a result of suspension of operation of business establishments, at 1000.³  The destruction  of the business sector in Greek cities was so extensive that the government applied the disaster rehabilitation model, giving emergency relief to business and workers who lost their sales or wages and were not covered by private insurance.⁴

1. ^{“2008 Civil Unrest in Greece,” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia (http://en.widipedia.org/wiki/%202008_civil_unrest_in_Greece).}

2. ^{The slogan, “cops, pigs, murderers” is an adaptation of the 1960s anti-war and civil rights demonstrations in the U.S.}

3. ^{For various types of losses see Ethnos, 10/10/08; Eleftherotypia, 10/10/08; Ta Nea, 11/12/2008; To Vima,14/12/2008. The juxtaposition of “property/shop windows” vs. “life”, with the “establishment” giving priority to “property/shop-windows” rather than life and with the “anti-establishment anarchists” giving priority to “life” rather than “property/shop-windows,” loses its credibility when the victims of violence are also the workers and their families in the lower strata of society.}

4. ^{See Ta Nea, 11/10/08. Insurance policies are not always clear with regard to the coverage for property damaged by demonstrators or by terrorist attacks (Eleftheros Typos, 9/12/2008). Aside from economic and unemployment costs, worthy of scientific study would also be the psychic costs. A woman who saw that her parked car was burnt-up apparently developed Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms. She said that she did not care so much for her car since it can be replaced by her insurance. What shocked her the most was the fact that “my private space was violated”. She added that “I am afraid anymore to go the center of Athens. I have panic crises: tachycardia, cold sweat etc. Anymore, I live with a permanent fear. I, who was never afraid, despite the fact that I have had enough hard experiences in my life” (A.P., “They burned up my car on Skoufa Street,” Vimagazino, 21/12/08, p. 14).}

Left (Photo 3): Youth Protest,   Ta Nea,  9/12/08.  Right(Photo 4):  Alexis Grigoropoulos, Eleftherotypia, 8/12/08  

The question of  target selection vs. indiscriminant violence constitutes an important sociological question.  Initially, at least, the demonstrators’ targets seemed indiscriminate and the violence was blind: they included not only police stations and police vans whom they held  responsible for the assassination of the young man and credit institutions/banks or local political party offices who were also held  responsible for the economic crisis but also  targets (e.g. kiosks, small businesses, bus stops, telephone booths, etc.) that seemed incomprehensible from a progressive class-analysis perspective. In due course, however, after the public outcry and after some internal differentiation in the community of the anarchists/anti-establishment demonstrators (e.g. condemnation of indiscriminate violence; initiation of a fund drive by an anarchist group for the rehabilitation of kiosk damages, etc.), the targets became more selective, focusing on police stations, banks, credit institutions. The literature and history indicate that  anarchists are not always unanimous on the use of violence as a tactic of  protest and social change;  moreover, there were indications that  blind violence and looting in the December events were not the strategy of ideological anarchists but were behaviors reinforced by lumpen elements (e.g. petty criminals, heroin addicts, gypsies, migrants, hooligans, and marginals without any political consciousness) who invaded the ranks of the anti-establishment anarchists.⁵ Nonetheless, these are working hypotheses and deserve more systematic analysis.   

Selection of graffiti on private and university buildings of Athens:  Left (Photo5):  “You speak of shop-windows, we speak about lives”.  Center (Photo 6):  “Billions for banks; bullets for youth. Down with “New Democracy” {governing party}. Right(Photo 7):  “Down with democracy; long live anarchy” (Photos: courtesy of N. Petropoulos,  December 2008).  

 The December demonstrations also impacted on the parliamentary political parties, all of whom condemned the murder of the young man by the police, with the ruling “New Democracy” conservative party viewing police brutality  more as an isolated phenomenon, while the more progressive parties (e.g. “Radical Left Alliance”) or press viewed it as a more systematic one.⁶ In addition, the governing  party restated its policy to protect the right of people and the youth to demonstrate peacefully for their rights, condemned the mass violence and the destruction by a minority of youth, and advocated a defensive police tactics to avoid further bloodshed; the PASOK socialist party  also  condemned the violence and recommended peaceful protests, accused the government for its policies that provoked the demonstrations and for its inability to protect the security of citizens, and called  for  elections to change the situation and restore public security;  the “Radical Left Alliance” did not initially strongly condemn the episodes of mass violence, characterized the demonstrations as a “social revolt”, and  called for an  understanding of their dynamics;⁷ the Communist Party besides accusing the two main parties for the past policies with regard to police organization  viewed  the destructive episodes as acts of provocation and  accused the “Radical Left Alliance” of  “patting on the back” the hood-covered youth who took the lead in the mass destruction; and, finally, he ultraconservative party (LAOS)  called for the  maintenance/restoration of order, the abolition of university asylum and proposed the criminalization  of the hood - wearing.   

5. ^{See N. G. Xidakis, Kathimerini, 14 December 2008; Ta Nea, 17-18/01/09. Among the 184 arrested in Athens (up to 17/12/08), 83 (45%) were Greeks and 101 (55%) foreigners; the foreigners, most of whom were illegal, were charged mostly for looting the damaged stores, while most of the Greeks were charged for attacks against the police and property destruction (Ta Nea, 17/12/08). Of special interest is the response of an anarchist (P. Papadopoulos, known as Cain) who also participated in the kiosk rehabilitation initiative and who abstained from a active participation in the December events: “The indignation for the murder of the 15-year old {A.G.} cannot be expressed with the setting afire of the Law School Library, or with the looting and the destruction of the personal properties of people. Anarchy is a place for social solidarity. We were the first to struggle for the 8-hour workday and the rights for workers. We had five dead in Chicago. You can’t be opposite society.” (S. Theodorakis, Ta Nea, 13-14/12/08.}

6. ^{See M. Nodarou, Eleftherotypia, 8/12/08 and 9/12/2008.}

7. ^{See also the publication of a calendar, “2008-2009: Pictures from the Future,” as an insert by the newspaper Avg” (“Dawn”), the organ of the “Radical Left Alliance”. The calendar features a picture of the A. Grigoropoulos on the cover, while the inside pages include pictures, slogans and graffiti of the demonstrations (e.g. “one bullet, 15 days that changed one generation”, “we have a revolt, Christmas is postponed”, “money for education, not for cops”, etc. ), confrontations of the youth with the police and happenings, all of which reinforce the conceptualization of the demonstrations as a “social revolt”. The calendar did not upset only the ultraconservative LAOS party and the Communist Party (though for different reasons) but also a number of important cadre of the “Radical Left Alliance.” A journalist deputy of the Communist party (L. Kaneli), wondered why there was a “heroizaton” of A. G., who happened to be a “bystander-victim” and not of Constantina Kouneva, a migrant trade-union activist who was victim of a vitriol attack in mid-December 2008 (Proto Thema, 11/01/09).}

Photos 8 & 9. Selected scenes of burned automobiles and businesses near Exarcheia and the historical National Technical University of Athens. The district is also called by local businessmen whose property was destroyed as the “Silicon Valley” of Greece because most of the stores in the area are dealing with the new technologies.  (Courtesy: N. Petropoulos, December 2008).

Public surveys conducted about a week after the onset of the violent demonstrations revealed the public’s beliefs.  The public believed that the December events were spontaneous and mass (not a minority) phenomenon, that they constituted a “social revolt”⁸,  that only a minority of demonstrators participated in mass violence, that both the death of Grigoropoulos and the subsequent mass violence affected their stance. In addition the Gallup results showed the public’s discontent with the handling  of the events by the government, the police, the mass media, the political leaders of the entire spectrum as well as with the deposition of the policeman who shot Grigoropoulos.⁹ The events impacted generally negatively on the governing “New Democracy” party, reducing its popularity but also on the “Radical Left Alliance” which saw its proportions to fall from highs of 16-18% in the winter of  2008 to lows of 6-7% after the December demonstrations. Although other factors (e.g. its stance on coalition government) may have affected the fall, the December events led to differentiations within the “Radical Left Alliance,” that called for a more unequivocal condemnation of the violent episodes¹⁰

The December 2008 events also stimulated a discussion among social scientists and political analysts, at home and abroad, as to their nature and causes. With regard to the nature, there was a controversy, if the events constituted a “social revolt” (koinoniki eksegersi), a “youth outburst” (ksepasma” or “ekrixi”) or “civil unrest”(“koinoniki anatarahi”). The interpretation seemed to depend upon participation in the events and one’s ideology, with the conservatives interpreting them more as civil unrest or just an outburst of violence while the more progressive people and the participants in the events as a “social revolt.” Still, there were others  who maintained that the December events were a complex phenomenon, with variegated composition and motivations for participation, that  it would be premature to make a decision.¹¹  Many analysts agreed, however, that the December events did not have the characteristics of the 1960s movements, with conspicuous leadership, an ideological platform and agenda of action. In any case, whether one calls the events a “revolt” or a “youth outburst”, or even a “youth riot”, no one would deny that the magnitude of the events constituted  a crisis for the Greek society, that called for an exploration of its causes and dynamics.  

8. ^{With regard to the nature of the December demonstrations (Kathimerini, 14/12/08), the survey had a serious methodological flaw. The respondents were given three “alternatives” with regard to the nature of the December events: (a) “a social revolt” , (b) “not a social revolt” and (c) no answer/don’t know. There should have been more “positive” alternatives, e. g. (a) social revolt (b) youth outburst (c) a youth riot, (d) other and (e) no answer/don’t know. The methodology used by the survey favored the interpretation of a “social revolt”. Since public perceptions are important in any movement, it is necessary to make correct estimates.}

9. ^{The condemnation of their colleagues’ actions by the president of the police trade-union organization, his inclusion of the police in the 700€ generation and his admonition against the targeting of the police by the media did not prevent the status-devaluation of the policeman’s occupation, especially since the press showed a series of other abuses by police perpetrators. Following the death of A.G., at the hands of the police, there were reports of social isolation of the children of policemen and concealment of their parents’ occupation. This is important to assess, since psychological support is not only needed for the families-victims of police brutality but also for the families one of whose members has committed illegal acts.}

10. ^{Kathimerini, 11/01/09. See also interview of an “anti-establishment anarchist” (N. Ioannou) who distanced himself from the violence of “uncontrollable groups” during the December events {a reason they changed their base from the National Technical University to the Athens Law School} as well as from the self-styled terrorist groups. With respect to the latter he said: “…Terrorism belongs to the past and cannot be an instrument of a group in rebellion. You cannot speak on behalf of society, as is done in a communiqué. You cannot speak without having a social mandate…” (Ta Nea, 17-18/01/09).}

11. ^{See K. Tsoucalas, Lifo, No. 144, 5/02/09.}

With regard the causes, almost all analysts agree that the death of Grigoropoulos was a spark {the precipitating even as we say in collective behavior} for the violent demonstrations, though some counted it as one of the fundamental causes invoking other cases of police brutality that were not accompanied by sanctions against the police perpetrators.¹² First, the presence of a “subculture of anarchy,” whose ideology questions the monopolization of legitimate violence by the state (See Max Weber) and whose strategy is to respond to state violence by violence against the state and its agents/symbols may have played a role.¹³ Another factor, no doubt also related to the “subculture of anarchy,” has to do with reactions of anarchists against the state for jailing their comrades, their need to show solidarity with them  and to demand their release from prison - a demand that was also  reflected in graffiti on buildings. Aside from the fact that there does not seem to be any uniformity with regard to the tactics of anarchists, these factors alone, however, cannot account for the recruitment of non-anarchists and the general population  in the mass protest demonstrations. Most analysts invoked structural and long-term underlying causes, including the uncertainties confronting the youth for the future, the risks for social exclusion and marginalization facing the youth who have made great private investments in their education, uncertainties exacerbated by the economic crisis generated by market economics; the loss of conventional constants such as the family traditions that puts greater challenges on modern youth to find their own paths; and the lack of commensurable investments for the educational system. Other factors revolve around the Greek political system and  include, among others, clientelism, nepotism, extreme partisanship, populism and scandals  that relegate Greece among the low ranks in international transparency standards, that block the operation of meritocracy and  the just distribution of justice   and  impact upon the youths’ future choices.¹⁴ Other analysts  look at the organization of the police forces (MAT) in accordance with military models or the obsolescent mission and role of the police, which increase animosity, stereotypes and  polarization between police and citizens with the known results.¹⁵ Others suggest that the youth violence has been reinforced, legitimated,  tolerated and broadened because of the presence of the  institution of the university asylum which prohibits the police from entering the university grounds. The University asylum was legislated in 1982, to honor the struggles of the students (who in 1973 had occupied the National Technical University of Athens and the University of Athens Law School) and their contribution to the fall of the dictatorship. According to some Greek constitutionalists, there is no other modern democracy that has a law for university asylum, it has only symbolic and historical significance and is superfluous–especially since it leads to a tolerance of violence and deviance within the universities.¹⁶ This tolerance is reinforced by the populism of all governing political parties that restrains them from implementing the university asylum law because of the political costs from a possible massacre following an  intervention by the police  but also by an atmosphere of terror on the part of university authorities because of fear of reprisals. Thus, the “patting of the back” of violent demonstrators is not an exclusive characteristic of the “Radical Left Alliance”, but endemic to the Greek political system. In a sense, we have what sociologists call institutionalized patterned deviance (violence).. Finally, to this complex of factors, one must also add the lack of federated organization of student organizations, which allow the more dynamic minority groups (usually extra-parliamentary groups or extra-university elements) to do their thing either within the universities or during street demonstrations.¹⁷  

12. ^{See for example V. Artinopoulou, criminologist, and N. Dimou who adopt such perspectives in conjunction with other social factors (e.g. failure of youth expectations, unemployment, disillusionment with politicians, etc.) (In S. Kapsali, “Why is violence gaining ground,” Eleftheros Typos, 14/12/08).}

13. ^{See also analyses by criminologist J. Panousis who said that excesses in the use of legitimate (“structural”) state violence led to excesses in “collective counter-violence”. He calls for a better demarcation of the limits of these two interwoven types of violence and for a new “social contract of trust between ourselves and others” (In S. Kapsali, “Why is violence gaining ground,” Eleftheros Typos, 14/12/08}

14. ^{For other causes, see Ta Nea, 10/12/08 (S.Seferiadis); To Vima, 14/12/08 (A. Liakou, S. Vidali); To Vima, 21/12/08 (N. Mouzelis); Kathimerini, 28/12/08 (M. Touman);Ta Nea, 27-28/12/08 (M.Keselman, S. Aromovitz, S. Seferiadis). Keselman lists commonalities in the causes of 1960 youth mobilizations (e.g. Columbia University, Paris, etc.) and the December 2008 Greek events (e.g. inequality, remoteness of educational and public authorities, political authority vacuum, and diversity of opinion among the participants and their leaders). Nonetheless, the matter of leadership and a platform of action were not explicit in the December 2008 events, due perhaps to the mobilization by anarchists and the spontaneity of the protest demonstrations.}

15. ^{To Vima, 14/12/08 (S. Vidali); Eleftheros Typos, 14/12/08 (A. Tsigris). Tsigris, a criminologist, faults the obsolescent role and mission of the police but also the social pathology (e.g. unemployment, inequality etc ) of modern Greek society.}

16. ^{See also S. Kalyvas, Ta Nea, 13-14/12/08 & 20-21/12/08; N. Alivizatos, Kathimerini, 22/02/09). In Greece, mass demonstrations and school occupations that are organized by legitimate trade-union and student organizations are often invaded by groups of hood-wearing youths, anti-establishment and extra-university groups, causing destruction and other forms of deviant behaviour, either inside or outside the university (e.g. destruction of private and public property, aggression against university officials, holding of university officials as hostages; interruption of university senate meetings, occupation of professors’ office, obstruction of operation of university etc.); these groups, the “Known-Unknowns”, as they are called, are rarely arrested or prosecuted, partly because of the university asylum, partly because of fear of university officials for reprisals, etc.). These situations and the impunity for the perpetrators lead to indignation among the public and the business community, but also to charges of state incompetence and the perception of the perpetrators are agents provocateur or even state organs. This non-prosecution of the “known-Unknowns” was a practice of both the major governing parties, suggesting that the “Radical Left Alliance” does not have a monopoly on “patting on the back” of violent groups. In any case, there is a need for more systematic study of these “Known-Unknown” groups to understand their actual social status and whether or not they can be equated with the ideological anarchists.}

17. ^{There used to be a National Student Union of Greece (EFEE) that acted as an umbrella organization for all student organizations, usually organized along party/ideological lines. After the fall of the dictatorship in 1974, this organization was abolished due to differences among student organizations and possibly due to the intervention of political parties themselves. One of the consequences of this dissolution is that student organizations hold separate student elections and announce separate election results which usually add to more than 100% of the student constituency. The lack of a federal student organization not only impacts on the control of demonstrations but constitutes a bad model for the future from the point of view of political socialization, perpetuating the extreme partisanship in Greek society.}

Aside from the December-like surprise attacks of hooded youth in various cities of Greece,¹⁸ the December events were followed during the next three months by other forms of violence: attacks against university professors,¹⁹  terrorist attacks by urban underground groups and  common criminal activities. The attacks on the professors  were carried out by anti-establishment hood-wearers and had also as targets professors with progressive ideologies. The terrorist attacks, claimed by a various underground  organizations, included  attacks on police forces, police stations, banks and businesses, TV stations, newspapers, attorney generals, lawyers, parliamentary deputies, party offices and state property. Some of these attacks were followed  by the release of a communiqué (hard copy or disk) to daily newspapers, stating the reasons for the attack. Two of the more violent underground organizations,  the “Sect of the Revolutionaries”(Sekta Epananastaton) and the “Revolutionary Struggle” (Epanastatikos Agonas)  released communiqués following their respective attacks. One of these (the “Revolutionaries’ Sect”), with attacks on police guards outside the Koridallos penitentiary and a TV station,  said in its communiqué that it will attack, without rationalizing its actions saying that words and analyses are dated, while the other (“Revolutionary Struggle”), with attacks predating the December events and with post-December attacks (an almost fatal one against a police guard outside the Ministry of Culture  and another aborted attack against the Citibank,) released long communiqués rationalizing the selection of its targets. The communiqués of the “Revolutionary Struggle” rationalized its attack on the police guard as an act of retaliation for the death of A.G. and also for other cases of police brutality that they list, where there was not the commensurate punishment of the police perpetrators.²⁰ In addition, their communiqués focus on the authors of the present economic crisis and project an anti-capitalist vision (e.g. 1871 Paris Commune, 1905 and 1917 soviets, 1918 Germany/1920 Italian factory councils, the rural communes of  Spain in 1936-37, the 1956 Hungarian workers’ councils, the May 1968 student and worker assemblies, the more recent examples of popular self-management of  the Zapatistas  community and the occupation of lands and factories by Brazilian landless and Argentine workers, following the breakdown of the economy in 2001-2002).²¹  The authorities and the media talk of “new generation of terrorists”, without ideology and with indiscriminate targets, while the terrorists in their communiqués attempt to rebut them, especially the part that has to do with target selection.²² In any case, there is no doubt that  the urban guerrilla organizations are exploiting the people’s discontent with the  police’s behavior (December demonstrations and Gallup polls) but especially the world economic crisis, to develop a critical mass of supporters for armed struggle, thinking perhaps that now the social conditions for revolutionary change  have reached maturity, something that was absent during the period of 17N action. 

18. ^{The most destructive episode was a skirmish by about 25 hooded youths in Kolonaki district, a higher strata area close to the center of Athens, where 80 stores, 37 private cars and six banks suffered serious damages (Ta Nea, 16/03/09).}

19. ^{See Ta Nea, 20/02/09 and Kathimerini, 22/02/09.}

20. ^{The possibility that the particular police guard/target was not guilty of police brutality or that he condemned the murder of A.G. or that he was indeed a member of the 700€ generation apparently does not constitute a dilemma for the members of the “Revolutionary Struggle”. The process of depersonalization and dehumanization, that can occur in any confrontational context, whether we talk about an international war or about police-citizen relations based on a military model, serves to neutralize any such dilemmas (See Communiqué of “Revolutionary Struggle”, To Pontiki, 15 /01/09 for such mechanisms of neutralization). Indeed, the need for depersonalization may be greater in domestic than in international conflicts.}

21. ^{For the communiqués (In Greek), see To Pontiki, 15/01/09 (“Revolutionary Struggle”), Ta Nea, 5/02/09 (“Revolutionaries’ Sect”), Ta Nea, 21-22/02/09 (“Revolutionaries’ Sect”), and To Pontiki, 12/03/09 (“Revolutionary Struggle”). For a time during the 1980s and the 1990s, the full publication of the terrorist communiqués was prohibited by law as a way of controlling the 17N actions; however, this was later judged ineffective and the law was rescinded. Some of the communiqués of the “Revolutionaries’ Struggle” group constitute a comprehensive, high-level analysis of the current economic crisis; they are indeed competitive with academic analyses and could attract followers were it not for the violence preceding their publication.}

22. ^{For “new generation of terrorists” see Ta Nea 6/02/09, Kathimerini, 22/02/09. During the period following the December 2008 events, there followed barrages of attacks (arson and gas- or fire- bombs), claimed by a variety of underground organizations besides the two already mentioned (e.g. “Fiery Shadows”, “Apostates of Calm Sleep”, “Popular Will”, “Groups for the Diffusion of Metropolitan Violence,” “Council for Destructuring Order”, “Gangs of Conscience”, etc.). There is a discussion among authorities with regard to the continuity of the recent terrorist organizations with past organizations (e.g. 17N), while the prevalent assessment regarding the organizations involved in arson and gas-bomb attacks is that “they are manifestations of the same organization, but use different names to show a proliferation of organizations and to disorient the authorities” (To Vima 8/03/09;5/04/09).}

 With regard to the common criminal activity,  statistics show an escalation   of  common crimes  such as kidnaps, robberies of banks and stores, and break-ins of private houses compared to the same period in previous years, bringing to mind scenes and  memories of the “Wild West”. In some of these criminal activities (e.g. bank and store robberies, house break-ins), young employees and couples  have lost their lives, while in other cases the victims were seriously injured.  Undoubtedly, the economic crisis and the rising unemployment rates that have led to desperation, could have also led to an escalation of criminal violence, a phenomenon that certainly is not restricted to Greece, but  calls for urgent measures, especially on all level of root causes, in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation.
The various forms of violent manifestations in Greek society, during the last three months,  have led the Greek government, and potential targets of the various forms of violence to take protective measures on various levels. The government itself, concerned about the results of polls showing loss of popularity and high levels of public insecurity²³ in a pre-election period, and about the potential impact on tourism especially during an ongoing economic crisis,  has been forced to take  measures promoting security. The government also consulted the Scotland Yard apparently for guidelines on the management of especially the political forms of violence such as terrorism.    Under consideration are a number of  mild measures, such better education and selection, a new philosophy and reorganization of police forces, although a proposal made by opposition parties for disarmament of the police is not under consideration.²⁴ On the other hand, the government is moving toward the adoption of a series of measures along the suppression dimension. Under serious consideration  is legislation,  following a proposal by the ultraconservatives, that would criminalize  hood-wearing  and   increase the penalties for crimes committed by hood-wearing individuals;²⁵  the doubling of  the Units for Restoring Order (MAT), the creation of special police units for rapid deployment in he historical center, and the creation of  special police units, with knowledge of martial arts, for arresting deviant demonstrators;²⁶ the reactivation of  some 1100 street cameras installed for prevention of terrorist attacks during the 2004 Olympics;²⁷  the establishment of a DNA bank, and the suspension of private communication laws under certain circumstances. Though the government officially has not adopted a clear-cut position, there is also serious consideration for changing the law concerning the university asylum or at least guaranteeing the enforcement of existent legislation. Finally, in the press there have also appeared articles stating that the government is considering the use of German shepherd dogs, water pressure from fire-fighting vehicles, and Tazer-M26 pistols that cause electroshock and immobilize the suspects, techniques reportedly used  by other countries (e.g. Great Britain and the U.S.) to control violent demonstrations²⁸   On the business and private level of social organization,  banks  are installing security doors, the stores are installing metallic shutters and more sensitive alarm systems, the households are  installing alarm systems,  while potential individual targets, either political or business,  are  increasing security guards and the purchase of bullet proof vehicles.²⁹   Generally, the people, as customers, as clients, or as taxpayers will be the eventual victims  of the increased security systems, in terms of freedom, long waiting lines, and economic costs. There is a danger that the focus on the violent manifestations of the minority of youth, rather than on  the just demands of the majority of angry youth who were involved in the demonstrations, may lead to more conservative and suppressive politics, rather  than to measures aiming at fundamental changes and responding to the just and genuine demands of today’s youth.³⁰
Concluding this brief analysis of a complex phenomenon,  whether we call the December events a “social revolt” or a “violent youth outburst” is immaterial; we should look it as a crisis that needs research into the fundamental causes and presents an opportunity for all the factors to intervene and implement the appropriate priorities due to  the exigency of the situation. There is a need for  the  government,  and those in a position to make decisions and change the course of things,  to focus on the  underlying causes of the December events (e.g. job insecurity, clientelism, scandals, inequality, police organization and behavior, violation of due process in justice systems, etc.), i.e. on the structural violence per se, and mitigate its impacts not only on the youth but also the general population, rather than giving priority  to methods of suppression. In this connection it is worth quoting the recommendation of a criminologist: “No matter how many measures we take, whatever level of combat readiness of our police that we attain, we will not have any essential outcomes unless we intervene preventively  in order to have a more just social state, to reduce unemployment, to close the gap between rich and poor, to reduce inequality.”³¹  In this connection, the recent proposal by the Greek Minister of Justice to abolish the special immunity (asylum) enjoyed by parliamentarians is a step in the right direction, if it is not a populist mechanism on the eve of elections.

 On the other hand,  responding to structural violence by violence (either by organized terrorist groups, by anarchists or spontaneous youth demonstrators), especially in a democracy that is the result of free and fair elections,  may not be the most effective way to mobilize the masses and to bring about genuine and permanent change in what admittedly is an imperfect and unjust social system. Aside from violating the principles of due process  for suspected wrongdoers, risking the victimization of third parties and  creating trauma among the families of the targets, the collateral victims and the perpetrators themselves,  they are also likely to abet the emergence of ultraconservative vigilante groups,³² perpetuate the cycle of violence within a society that has not yet recovered from a traumatic civil war, and, finally, increase the burdens on the victims of structural violence (the general population) when a government  gives priority to suppression methods. The dissidents of the system should perhaps  have second thoughts regarding the use of violent methods to reduce the structural pain that still characterizes many democracies and  give more serious consideration to the repertory of non-violent methods used by Gandhi to put an end to British colonialism and which would have a broader public consensus. If Gandhi was so effective when dealing with an imperialist of different culture and religion, imagine how more effective can be the challengers who share basically the same culture and religion with the “enemy system”. I might add  that the  “pen” –by locating, exposing and condemning the structural violence present in parliamentary democracies-  might be a more effective weapon in mobilizing  the masses and bringing about structural changes than the “sword”, especially  during this age of information and globalization. 

23. ^{Aside from the negative assessments of government management of demonstrations, the polls also showed for the first time higher percentages concerned about “crime” (53,2%) than the “economic crisis”(41,8%), as well as higher percentages for securing of “ safety and security” than for protection of “citizen’s rights and freedom”. More specifically, the ALCO survey showed that 76% expect harsher measures to control crime, 76% expect the government to intervene in universities whenever there takes place criminal acts, 62% agree with the penalization of ‘hood-wearing” and 72% agreed with the expulsion of illegal migrants (See To Vima, 29/03/2009).}

24. ^{Though there was pre-existent institutional provisions for psycho-social evaluations of police candidates, they were not used (D. Antoniou, Kathimerini, 8/02/09), perhaps due to the pre-eminence of a military model in police-citizen relations. After the episode with Grigoropoulos and an “accidental” shooting of a private security man of the American Ambassador’s house by a city policeman also on duty outside the Ambassador’s house, there were more pressures on the government to use psychologists in police selection and placement (See A. Spanou, Eleftheros Typos, 14/12/08 Kathimerini, 14/02/09) Although the invocation by the policeman’s defense and his mother of the attacks on American embassy by 17N and on the police after the murder of A.G. as sources of anxiety and fear leading to the accidental shooting may have impacted on the psychology of the policeman (See Ta Nea, 7-8/02/09), one cannot also exclude the role of personality and other factors in this accidental shooting, making indeed necessary the use of psychological testing and training for responding to such situations. For proposed measures stressing the suppression aspects of “social control” see Ta Nea, 22/12/2008; 18/03/09; 19/03/09; 23/03/09; 26/03/09; 28-29/03/09)}

25. ^{This proposal is seriously being considered despite its uselessness in countries (Germany) which have tried it and the objections of Greek Bar Association and the progressive opposition parties (Ta Nea, 18/03/09, 20/03/09, 2/04/09). Actually, the Greek word for hood is “koukoula” (kokouloforos=hood-wearer ). A koukoula usually covers the head and serves both the functions of fashion and protection from extreme weather. However, in practice the koukoula has also come to include cloth that covers the face, the nose and mouth in order to hide characteristics or even protect from teargas as the demonstrators themselves maintain. Although the more correct term to use would be mask-wearers (maskoforos), the use of the word koukoula has many advantages since it is a root for the word, koukoulono (verb form) which metaphorically means cover up {of crime, of scandals etc }.}

26. ^{Ta Nea, 28-29/03/09.}

27. ^{Great Britain has 4,2 million cameras, France 60,000, Beijing 280,000+, Three Streets of Manhattan, N.Y. (4,167), Japan (Undisclosed), Germany/Norway/Spain/Austria (only in sensitive areas) and Denmark (none)(Ta Nea, 2/04/09) . The same journalistic sources note that although traffic violations in Great Britain were reduced, there was no impact upon the crime rate following installation of cameras. Nonetheless, the writer would be interested in more systematic documentation of the impact of cameras, using as indices all kinds of violence (common crime, terrorism, vandalism etc.).}

28. ^{For use of dogs, see Ta Nea, and 11/02/09. Although the Tazer M-26 electroshock pistols are used under special circumstances, there are charges by the International Amnesty that the use of this weapon by the police has been responsible for 245 deaths (Ta Nea, 20/01/09).}

29. ^{There are journalistic reports that the demand for metallic security shutters by stores increase by 20% after the December events, while the demand by industrialists, ship owners and by people with high economic status for bullet-proof, “automobiles-fortresses” (e.g. Discovery 3 and Range Rover Classic) increased by 70% and for security services by 28% (Ta Nea, 19/02/09, 17/03/09)).}

30. ^{See also K. Tsoucalas, To Vima, 14/12/08.}

31. ^{A. Tsigris, To Vima, 29/03/09.}

32. ^{See D. Vytholkas & A. Hekimoglou, “Koukoulofori, Chrysavgites kai Aganaktismeni polites” (“Hood-wearers, gold-dawners and indignant citizens”) To Vima, 14/12/08 and A. Hekimoglou, “The ‘egg of the snake’ raises its head”, To Vima, 5/04/09.}